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Abstract 
In recent years, considerable attention has been given to the role 
of ‘less lethal’ options in alleviating the varied problems 
associated with the police use of force.  Highly supportive claims 
have been made by manufacturers, police agencies, and others 
relating to the ability of such devices to result in reduced injuries 
to both officers and members of the public.  Special Issue 3 of 
Policing regarding the ‘Use of Force’, for instance, included 
various positive statements about the place and purpose of less 
lethal weapons.  While not wishing to completely dismiss such 
claims, this article seeks to bring scrutiny to bear on them.  The 
basis for this skepticism derives from recasting common 
depictions of these weapons within the spectrum of force 
options, considering the past history of their deployment, and 
moving beyond treating them in a narrow, technical manner.  
Introduction 
The legitimacy of the use of force by the police in democratic societies 
often  generates  significant  controversy  because  it  raises  the 
fundamental question of exactly what force is justified against citizens 
(Waddington 1999, Lawrence 2000).  Perhaps as much as any other 
aspects  of  policing,  the  use  of  force  is  at  the  heart  of  the  many 
tensions in the policing of liberal societies (Reiner, 1997).  As issues 
about what constitutes acceptable force are inexplicably linked with 
the authority and the legitimacy of the police, they are a matter of 
considerable  importance  for  many  inside  and  outside  of  law 
enforcement agencies. Against this backdrop of possible disagreement 
and debate, considerable attention has been given to the role of so-
called  ‘less  lethal’  weapons  in  alleviating  disputes  and  minimizing 
injuries.   Highly  supportive  claims  have  been  issued  by 
manufacturers, police agencies, and others relating to the ability of 
such devices to reduce harm to officers, suspects, and members of the 
public  (Rappert  2003a).   The  resulting  decrease  in  injuries  and 
litigation is said to bring many additional benefits.   
This article takes up the call by Denis Bradley (2004) of the Northern 
Ireland Police Board to ask critical questions about the use of force in 
policing.   While  not  wishing to  dismiss  the potential  of  alternative 
force  options  to  help  realise  more  preferable  outcomes,  the 
deployment less-lethal weapons does raise grounds for concern.  How 
and  in  what  situation  they  should  be  used  are  some  issues  for 
concern.  It cannot be assumed that their employment will result in 
minimal or even reduced injury.  Moreover, though many government 
agencies and corporations boast about their safety testing procedures 
and  the  strict  rules  in  place  governing  their  use,  past  experience 
across  many  countries  indicates  such  statements  should  be 
approached with caution (see, e.g., Rappert 2003b).
Policing Issue 3 
The contributions in Issue 3 of  Policing on ‘Use of Force’ provide a 
number of  valuable  insights  regarding historical  and contemporary 
issues  associated  with  the  use  of  force  by  the  police.   With  the 
exception  of  articles  by  Kleinig  (2007)  and  Amnesty  International 
(Sprague  2007)  about  tasers,  less  lethal  options  figure  as  part  of 
wider  analyses.   Three  themes  are  possible  to  identify  in  these 
remaining articles though.
Firstly, less lethal weapons are overwhelmingly approached as options 
that can be used in lieu of lethal force (firearms).  Burrows (2007), for 
instance, is concerned about the decision making by firearms officers 
and therefore how alternative options other than firearms may change 
an  officer’s  actions.   Both  the  former  British Police  Complaints 
Authority  (PCA)  and  the  current  Independent  Police  Complaints 
Commission  (Glass  2007)  endorse  the  introduction  of  less  lethal 
options and treat recent interest in the UK -specifically in relation to 
situations  were  firearms  would  be  or  have  been  used  –  as 
inappropriate .   
Secondly,  little  attention  is  give  to  the  past  development  and 
deployments going beyond very recent years.  Although providing a 
wide ranging study of firearms in the British police, Waldren (2007) 
treats less lethal weapons as having a short pedigree.  In line with the 
previous point too, he suggests a break with the past, stating ‘Today, 
the police service is trying to find a ‘less-lethal’ means of dealing with 
persons who would otherwise be shot.’  
 
And thirdly, the use of less lethal weapons is considered in largely 
technical terms.  They are treated as options that resolve difficulties, 
not  ones that  would raise social,  ethical,  and political  questions of 
their own.  So while both Burrows (2007) and Dror (2007) note that 
the  availability  of  such options  might  affect  (and  even complicate) 
officer decision making, this is treated as a relatively minor concern.  
These three themes are important because they help form a particular 
and a limited picture.  This picture is both highly supportive of less 
lethal  weapons  and offers  little  space  for  brining critical  points  to 
bear.   The  remainder  of  this  article  challenges  this  framing  by 
questioning  the  likely  uses  of  these  devices  in  practice,  drawing 
attention  to  their  history,  and  moving  beyond  narrow  technical 
considerations.
Effective Tools? 
Of  central  importance  to  less  lethal  weapons  is  whether  their 
introduction fulfils the functions stated for them.  Principal among the 
claims made is their potential to result in reduced injuries to officers 
and  suspects.   Another  is  that  they  provide  effective  means  of 
temporarily  incapacitating  individuals.   Speaking  about  less  lethal 
weapons, Waldren (2007) claims that ‘They all work to a greater or 
lesser extent if they are used within the parameters placed upon them 
by their manufacturers’ (emphasis in the original).   Yet this sort of 
statement should beg certain questions:  What counts as ‘working’? 
Does it matter how low the ‘lesser extent’ goes?  Are the parameters 
specified for their use in line with the actual condition of usage?
Incapicitant sprays 
It  is possible to point to prominent examples where initially highly 
supportive  effectiveness  claims  have  given  way  to  less  optimistic 
assessments.  For example, in 1995 the US International Association 
of Chiefs of Police (IACP) examined the development of pepper sprays 
in the Baltimore Police Department during 1993-4.  This well known 
study was the first of its kind and proved central to the justification 
for pepper sprays by the US National Institute of Justice.  Following 
its  endorsement,  these  devices  were  widely  adopted  in  the  US. 
Drawing on use of force data sheets and unstructured interviews with 
officers, the IACP report made many highly supportive claims about 
the sprays.  For instance, they were said to be effective in 90% of 
cases.  However, a later and much more comprehensive analysis was 
given of this Baltimore experience in 1999 (Kaminski et al. 1999).  The 
results  were  significantly  more  ambivalent.   The  later  findings  for 
effectiveness were based on three officer-based standards:  whether 
the spray eased arrest, whether it incapacitated subjects, and what 
their behaviour was after receiving the spray.  In compiling figures on 
these  different  measures,  the  authors  concluded  that,  ‘researchers 
can  obtain  substantively  different  results  regarding  the  effects  of 
explanatory factors when using different criteria…’ (ibid.:  19).  The 
conclusions of  this second study challenged many of  the optimistic 
statements that justified the widespread adoption of the sprays. 
In  another  article  (Rappert  20021),  I  traced  out  something  of  the 
history of highly supportive claims about types of chemical sprays and 
concluded that,
 
significant areas of concern and uncertainty exist in relation to 
the  deployment  of  incapacitant  sprays.   Those  police  forces 
considering such a use of force option are advised to do so with 
considerable  caution  and  a  healthy  degree  of  scepticism 
regarding benefits of these devices.
This  was  because  major  inconsistencies  and  deficiencies  could  be 
identified  in  the  evaluations  by  police-related  agencies,  academics, 
and manufacturers of these devices.  
Consider this conclusion in relation to the question of whether the 
introduction  of  chemical  sprays  reduce  injuries  to  officers:  in  the 
Fourth Report of  the  Steering Group (2004) in  response to  Patten 
Report  Recommendations  69  and  70 relating  to  public  order 
equipment,  the UK Steering Group made various supportive claims 
about the consequences of CS sprays in England and Wales.  As part 
of this, the Group cited a 2000 report by the PCA – (PCA 2000) – to 
contest  that  the  introduction  of  CS  sprays  in  the  mid-1990s  had 
decreased assaults on police officers.
1 Rappert,  B.  (2002),  ‘Assessing Chemical Incapacitants”  International  Journal of 
Police Science and Management, 4(2): 115-126.
A  much  more  solid  basis  for  evidence  about  the  impact  of  the 
introduction of  the sprays on assaults  was given in the initial  trial 
review  conducted  by  the  Police  Research  Group  (PRG  1996).   By 
splitting up forces in England and Wales between those that did and 
did  not  carry  the  sprays,  the  PRG  trial  provided  the  most 
comprehensive  and  rigorous  testing  done  of  whether  their 
introduction prevented assaults.  It found that while CS spray carrying 
police officers perceived a marked reduction in the number of police 
assaults against them, force data did not suggest that their possession 
led to  any reported reduction in assaults.  The discrepancy between 
perceived and recorded information raises important questions about 
the validity of research methodologies.  Just as the difference between 
the ‘fear of crime’ and the recorded rates of crimes has generated 
much  policy  discussion,  similar  dynamics  might  be  identified  with 
regard to officer fear of assault and recorded assault rates.  Yet, in 
any  case,  this  inconvenient  PRG finding  has  failed  to  receive  any 
attention  in  the  subsequent  promotional  accounts  about  the 
effectiveness of the sprays by the Home Office or others.  
As an overall point then, the definition and evidence of the success of 
less lethal weapons matters.
Tasers
Consider  another  technology  on  the  theme  of  effectiveness  –  the 
Taser.   Highly  optimistic  statements  about  the  degree  of  its 
effectiveness in operational situations can be called into question by 
citing field experience elsewhere.  As an instance of this, on the basis 
of  251  applications of  the  M26  Taser  between  January  2001  and 
December 2002, the Seattle Police Department credited its use ‘with 
controlling  subject  or  resolving  situation  [sic]  in  82%  of  all 
applications  and  89% of  those  where  contact  was  made’  (Kimerer 
2003). These figures consisted of 56% dart mode use, 32% stun mode 
use, and 12% where both were used.  By just what criteria instances 
of force were credited with controlling or resolving was not specified. 
However,  82% is  a  rather  unexceptional  effectiveness  figure  when 
compared to other types of force options and not ‘as Close to 100% 
TAKEDOWN  POWER  as  You  Can  Get’  as  promoted  in  publicity 
material describing the Taser (Taser International 2000).  
On 21 April 2003, a year long Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) trial began with the Taser International M26 Advanced Taser 
in five police forces in England and Wales.  On 15 September 2003 
the  Parliamentary  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home 
Department authorized chief officers throughout England & Wales to 
deploy Tasers with authorized firearms officers.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) conducted an evaluation of the trial 
for  the  Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers.   One  of  its  main 
conclusions was that:
In general, the Taser device was viewed by the firearms officers 
involved in the trial as a useful and effective piece of equipment. 
The officers to whom we spoke in all of the pilot forces were 
positive about its potential benefits (ibid: 3). 
Yet  in  making  this  case,  criteria  were  not  given  for  measuring 
effectiveness.   Rather,  the evidence consisted of  Taser  Deployment 
Reports  and  interviews  with  officers.   This  was  problematic  given 
some  of  the  previous  points  made  here.   One  issue  with  officer 
interviews  relates  to  the  previously  mentioned  and  questionable 
supportive  perceptions  associated  with  the  consequences  of  CS 
sprays.   This  is  perhaps  especially  pertinent  in  the  case  of  police 
forces and police officers that put themselves forward to trial  new 
technology. 
In  relation  to  Taser  Deployment  Reports,  while  the  report  form 
included a slot about the outcomes of incidents, a couple of sceptical 
observations can be made.  First, simply recording outcomes does not 
provide the basis for the types of differentiation of effects; the kind 
that  Kaminski et al. (19992) relied on to scrutinize and revise highly 
optimistic statements about pepper sprays.  Secondly, attributing the 
outcome to  Taser  is  not  straightforward.   This  report  form had  a 
limited space for officers to describe the result of the operation.  It 
seems reasonable to assume that most officers would have given a 
short account of the final outcome of a Taser deployment that did not 
go  into  much  detail  about  the  actual  sequence  of  events.   The 
potential problem with this is that it becomes very difficult to properly 
assess  why  particular  outcomes  resulted.   For  instance,  the  trial 
review states:
in many cases, officers have needed to do no more than aim, or 
aim and use the ‘red dot’ laser sight, or aim and arc Taser to 
ensure compliance on the part of the suspect. Taser appears to 
have a high visual deterrent value which can enable officers to 
de-escalate  possibly  violent  situations  relatively  quickly  and 
easily (ibid. 23).
It may well be the case that in many instances Tasers were produced 
and  incidents  were  resolved  without  actually  firing.   However, 
substantiating that such outcomes were as a result  of the Taser is 
more problematic.  The production of any sort of weapon, or even a 
2 Kaminski,  R,  Edwards,  S.  and  J.  Johnson.  (1999),  ‘Assessing  the Incapacitative 
Effects of Pepper Spray during Resistive Encounters with the Police’, Policing, 22: 7-
29.
(further)  verbal  warning,  might  have  had  the  same result.   As  an 
additional point of concern, the power attributed to the red dot raises 
the question of whether the use of such laser sightings fitted on to 
firearms, or even separate from them, might have the same effect.  At 
least  as  far  back  as  1996,  for  instance,  manufactures  sought  to 
develop  laser  sightings  for  police  pistols  so  as  to  gain  compliance 
(Houde-Walter 1996).  
Certain problems about the size of the M26 Taser, the battery packs 
which power it, the  discharge recorder which records time of firing, 
and the unfamiliarity of officers with Taser weapon were noted in the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, but deemed minor or easily surmountable 
teething problems; as in line with many of the commentators to Issue 
3 of  Policing.  More problematic points about the UK evaluation of 
Tasers can be raised.  During the trial, the Metropolitan Police force 
also conducted an evaluation.  In the  Review Of Taser Within The 
MPS,  it  was  stated  that  between 21 April  2003 and 8  July  2004 
Tasers were used 42 times (Turner 2004). This included 15 actual 
discharges  and 22 occasions at  which Tasers  were only  aimed at 
subjects.   The complete  commentary  on  the evaluation section is 
given below.   
Evidence  for  the  Efficacy  of  Tasers  in  MPS  Report: 
Evaluation of Taser use
18  The Taser  has  proved to  be an extremely  effective item of 
policing  equipment.  On almost  every  occasion  that  it  has  been 
“used” it  has  provided a  positive outcome to  a  violent  incident 
allowing  officers  an  alternative  option  to  that  of  reverting  to 
conventional  firearms.  It  is  no  coincidence  that  the  number  of 
police  shootings  has  been  significantly  reduced  since  its 
introduction however; it cannot be seen as a panacea. The Taser 
has a limited range of 21 feet and due to the spread of the barbs it 
often  cannot  be  used  in  confined  areas  with  obstructions.  The 
Taser has also failed on two operational occasions.
19  Taser has been welcomed by officers who see it as another 
option  in  the  “toolbox”.  The  option  to  avoid  recourse  to 
conventional  firearms  is  welcomed  by  all.  There  are  many 
instances  where  those  who  have  been  the  subject  of  a  Taser 
discharge would have been shot with conventional firearms had 
the officer not had a less lethal option. The resultant saving in 
terms of subsequent enquiries and the impact on the community, 
the Service the officers and the individuals concerned have been 
immeasurable.
Following on from the points in this section, when the MPS review 
stated that:
The Taser has proved to be an extremely effective item of policing 
equipment.  On almost every occasion that it has been “used” it 
has  provided a positive outcome to a violent  incident  allowing 
officers an alternative option to that of reverting to conventional 
firearms. 
I would argue that such unsubstantiated and ambiguous statements 
are  inadequate.   With  the  reliability  and  multiple  discharge 
difficulties noted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004), it would seem 
that  this  statement  means  that  Tasers  have  made  a  positive 
contribution rather than directly led to a positive outcome.  Whether 
or not such difficulties pertained to the MPS, phrases such as ‘on 
almost  every  occasion’  and  ‘provided  a  positive  outcome’  need 
elaboration.  The suggestion in point 19 of the MPS Report of 2004 
(above) should also be substantiated.   It is instructive to compare 
such optimistic claims with statistics on the police use of firearms. 
Taking the figures given by Davies (2004), in the whole of England 
and Wales during 2003-4, there was one death from the police use of 
firearms.  In terms of the police forces deploying the Tasers during 
the trial, official figures indicate that four of the five trial forces had 
zero  firearm  discharges  between  2001-3.   The  fifth  force 
(presumably the Metropolitan Police Service), used firearms once in 
2003, twice in 2002, and once in 2001: a total of four times in three 
years.  In light of such figures, the claims made in the Met Taser 
report that between April 2003 – and July 2004 there were ‘many 
instances  where  those  who  have  been  the  subject  of  a  Taser 
discharge would have been shot with conventional firearms had the 
officer not had a less lethal option’  could well be questioned.   
The above paragraphs suggest the need for caution when considering 
claims  about  the  effectiveness  and  implications  of  deploying  less 
lethal  weapons.   Such  claims  deserve  close  scrutiny,  particularly 
regarding how the data is obtained and how conclusions are drawn.  
‘Is it Better to Be Shot?’ 
Moving beyond matters of effectiveness, additional concerns can be 
raised about the central pillars for justifying less lethal weapons.  A 
recurring approach for thinking about these devices in Policing Issue 
3 was as firearms substitutes.  Seen in this way, any force option that 
did  not  have  the  same  lethality  potential  would  have  obvious 
advantages.  
But as is apparent in the aforementioned figures for firearms use in 
the forces that originally trialled the Taser in England and Wales, even 
when less lethal weapons are deployed to firearms officers, they are 
likely to be used in a far wider range of situations than where firearms 
would  be  used.   In  certain  respects  this  is  not  surprising  or 
problematic.   Because  they  are  different  types  of  weapons,  they 
should be used in different types of situations.  But this means that 
instead of being portrayed as a substitute for firearms, Tasers should 
predominantly function as alternatives to other force options such as 
‘hands-on’ tactics, batons, CS sprays or conflict resolution strategies. 
As such, their benefits and risks need to be considered in relation to 
these options.  When one moves from the most extreme situations, 
then the acceptability of force options will require a careful weighing 
of concerns about the safety of officers, recipients and bystanders.  
It is unfortunate then that much of the support for the initial Taser 
trials  -  as  expressed  in  the  Police  Complaints  Authority  (2003) 
Firearms Report 2003 -  derived from their use as an alternative to 
firearms.  This is especially so because, as expressed in the summary 
findings  of  the  trial  review  by  PricewaterhouseCoopers  and  the 
Review Of Taser Within The MPS,  it is apparent that individuals in 
some forces sought a much more extensive deployment from early on. 
But during the trial period, this looming and likely wider remit was 
not a topic for public discussion. As in the case of the CS sprays, much 
of their initial public justification related to extreme situations which 
would only constitute a fraction of usages.
However,  issues  about  usage  and  effects  go  further.   Both  Kleinig 
(2007)  and  Amnesty  International  (Sprague  2007)  raised  concerns 
whether  the  likely  effects  of  Tasers  means  that  ‘officers  may  find 
themselves tempted to employ a particular means in circumstances in 
which it is unnecessary or inappropriate’ (Kleinig 2007).  Here the 
concern  is  that  because  of  their  likely  limited  long  terms  effects 
certain force options might become a routine and convenient option 
when dealing with troubling situations.  
Amnesty International (2004) concluded that in the US and Canada 
‘some Departments are deploying Tasers in routine arrest situations, 
at  the  first  sign  of  resistance  or  in  the  face  of  relatively  minor 
resistance.’    These included individuals rejecting an order,  acts of 
passive  resistance,  refusals  to  be  handcuffed,  situations  where 
individuals were being handcuffed, and against unarmed children or 
elderly adults who were arguably posing little threat to themselves or 
others.  In a survey Amnesty International conducted at the time with 
30 US Police Departments known to deploy Tasers, it was apparent 
that the weapons were often used very soon after  soft ‘hands-on’ or 
verbal techniques.  
Such practices should not be seen as aberrations.  The use of Tasers 
as compliance devices is not unexpected - such practices have been 
actively  promoted by  the  main  manufacturer.    In  October  2002 I 
attended  a  Taser  International  sponsored  promotional  European 
conference/training workshop in Brussels (Rappert 2003c).  Based on 
practices in the US, attendees learned how to employ the Taser as a 
compliance device  for  getting  unruly  individuals  in  police  cars.   A 
shock to the outside of the knee, for instance, and a suspect would 
swiftly fold.  Instead of manually applying physical force to sensitive 
pressure  points  in  the  body  (for  example  during  handcuffing), 
attendees learned that electroshocks were highly effective.  Finally, a 
Taser International representative suggested that these devices were 
‘good  for  demonstrators’,  this  including  ‘tree  huggers’  and  those 
shouting ‘hell no, we won’t go’.  The Taser International lesson plan at 
the time stated:
The  ADVANCED  TASER  is  not  a  substitute  for  lethal  force. 
However,  many  situations  that  begin  as  standoffs  have  the 
potential to escalate to lethal force.  Early, aggressive use of a 
less-lethal  weapon  like  the  M26  can  prevent  many  of  these 
situations  from  escalating  to  deadly  force  levels  (TASER 
International 2003: 2).
Applying force early in potential conflict situations or using it as a 
means of gaining rapid compliance might reduce injuries to officers. 
Yet, it is less than clear that operational efficiency should be the only 
or dominant consideration. 
Tasers (and related electroshock devices) are not the only sort of less 
lethal weapons where questions have been raised about whether the 
availability  of  certain  types  of  force  options  eventually  results  in 
greater use of force.  Lumb and Friday (1997) conducted a study of 
OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) sprays in Concord, North Carolina (US) and 
found a substantial increase in use of force reports during the trials 
than  that  recorded  pre-  or  post-trial.   This  disparity  could  not  be 
explained by trends in arrests or other factors. They conjectured that 
the  sprays  gave  officers  a  perception  of  having  more  control  over 
situations and thus led to an increased willingness to use force.  
Concerns about how the use of an option can spread over time have 
been voiced in the UK with regard to chemical sprays. CS sprays were 
originally popularly portrayed as an intermediate option between the 
baton and firearms (Campbell 1996; Rayment 1996).  During the trials 
and  for  some  years  afterwards,  the  spray  was  intended  as  a  last 
measure in the restraint of violent individuals (Straw 1999: column 
691).  However, some have argued that in practice the mentally ill, 
pensioners, and children have all been on the receiving end of sprays 
in situations that posed little serious threat to officers (Kossoff 1998).
Force Guidelines
Of course, against such potential concerns it can be argued that what 
Nick  Hardwick  (Chair  of  the  Independent  Police  Complaints 
Commission)  said  in  relation  to  Taser:  ‘the  key  to  successful 
deployment lies in continuing to provide clear guidance and adequate 
training’ (IPCC 2004).  While the sort of statement that is ubiquitous 
in  discussions  about  less  lethal  weapons  and  guidance,  such  a 
statement also belies much of practice.  This should raise questions 
about what is commonly sought from guidance in relation to its role in 
public reassurances about force. For instance, the ACPO Operational 
Guidance given to officers for the 2003 trial was almost completely 
absent of details regarding when the use of Tasers is appropriate or 
inappropriate.  Even where a ‘don’t’ was identified in Para 9.6 of the 
Guidance (‘In stun mode the Taser should be pressed directly to the 
subjects body [sic].  Unless absolutely necessary in order to protect 
life the Taser should not, due to increased factors, be applied directly 
to the subjects’ neck or head.’), this restriction was itself qualified. 
There is a basic tension in devising guidance on the use of force. If 
they are highly proscriptive they lack flexibility and are likely to be 
seen  as  unrealistic.  However,  rules  without  any  teeth  would  lack 
public credibility and risk allegations of an ad hoc deployment.  Just 
how this tension gets resolved speaks to basic matters about assuring 
police accountability. 
The  issuing  of  guidance  meant  to  ‘inform  and  support  decision 
making’ in UK policing rather than specifying ‘do’s and don’ts’ is not 
limited  to  Tasers.    The  previous  1996  Guidelines  for  CS  sprays 
exhibited  a  similar  tension.   The  non-legally  binding  guidelines 
specified that the sprays should be used against:
(1) those offering a level of violence which cannot be 
appropriately dealt with by ‘empty hands’ techniques, 
and
(2)  violent  offenders,  other  than  those  armed  with 
firearms  or  similar  remote  injury  weapons,  where 
failure  to  induce  ‘immediate’  incapacitation  would 
increase the risks to all present (ACPO 1996).3
Certain proscriptions were given.  The use of the spray against those 
with a firearm, for instance, was deemed ‘inappropriate and should 
not be considered.’  Officers should not  use the sprays within three 
feet  of  a  target  ‘unless  life  is  at  risk’.   Despite  the  qualified  and 
provisional character of such stipulations, their inflexibility brought a 
rewriting  in  1999 (Haynes   2000).   Whereas  in  1996  Guidelines  were 
issued, in 1999  Guidance  was issued – with the effect of reinforcing 
the  provisional  character  of  the  ‘do’s  and  don’ts’.   The  latter 
Guidance  was intended to ‘support and inform’ individual officers in 
determining what constitutes reasonable and necessary force.  So, the 
1999 Guidance advised officers not to use the sprays below three feet, 
unless  it  cannot  be  avoided.   Possibilities  for  cross-contamination 
meant  the  sprays  should  not  be  used  in  crowd  control  situations 
unless the officer can justify their actions. Etc.  The general thrust of 
the  Guidance was that it is for officers to decide on and justify the 
suitability of resorting to the sprays on a case-by-case basis.  
As noted by Kleinig (2007), the notion of a use of force continuum in 
many US police agencies stands in contrast to the common approach 
for  thinking  about  force  guidelines  in  Great  Britain.   In  the  US, 
questions about the appropriateness of force options turn on where 
they  are  placed  along  a  spectrum.   Of  course,  it  should  be 
remembered that rules given to officers on the appropriateness of use 
of force in the US and the UK do not stand on their own, but are part 
of wider systems of training and oversight. 
The point of this section is not to advocate a more US-style model as 
an alternative to the discretionary centred model in England & Wales. 
Instead,  it  is  to  point  out  that  one  of  the  pillars  often  cited  for 
ensuring the appropriate use of force – guidance to officers – needs to 
be given close scrutiny.   That guidance does not always play the clear 
role  accorded  to  it  in  public  assurances.   Instead,  as  with  other 
aspects of the governance of less lethal weapons, it should be treated 
as a matter that raises basic questions about policing, discretion, and 
public accountability.   
Institutional Governance 
3 Association of Chief Police Officers (1996), Police Trials of CS for Self­defence in England and Wales ­  
1996, ACPO Guidelines for Use, London: House of Commons Library. 
The  last  point  suggests  the  need  to  move  beyond  a  narrow 
consideration  of  technology  in  considering  the  possible  issues  at 
stake.  To continue, the attention afforded to the medical effects of 
less-lethal weapons has increased significantly in recent years.  That 
is  evidenced  in  the  contrast  between  the  minimal  studies  in  past 
decades and the types of pre-deployment reviews given in reports of 
the Steering Group for Patten Report Recommendations 69 and 70 
Relating to Public Order Equipment.  
While the rigour and adequacy of medical evaluations is a continuing 
source  of  concern  for  some  (see  Sprague  [2007]),  predicative 
evaluations are just  one part  of  ensuring appropriate deployments. 
Like any technology,  with  these weapons there is  the potential  for 
unforeseen risks that no amount of precaution can completely avoid. 
Medical and technical assessments, no matter how rigorous, cannot in 
and of themselves guarantee the acceptability of the effects of such 
weapons in practice.  The types of encounters experienced and the 
manner weapons are used, can often differ from what is specified in 
agency or manufacturer recommendations.  Surveillance procedures 
need to be in place to monitor deployments and police forces need to 
adopt their tactics and technology depending on experiences.  
Much  of  the  focus  of  the  Steering  Group  in  the  UK  as  well  as 
elsewhere vis-à-vis medical effects has been on considering possible 
technical innovations rather than institutional reforms.  The latter are 
required to achieve a reliable understanding of effects within police 
forces and to make these transparent to the public.  For instance, a 
group of physicians in California considered a number of the problems 
associated  with  assessing  the  injuries  sustained  by  kinetic  impact 
weapons  (Brito  et  al.  2001).   They  made various  points  about  the 
potential for underestimating injury from less lethal weapons because 
of  ill-judged  presumptions  about  how  they  would  be  used  (i.e., 
according  to  the  formal  guidelines)  and  the  need  for  more  robust 
assessments systems than might be envisioned.  Elsewhere,  I  have 
argued that accurately assessing the injuries for officers and members 
of  the  public  from CS sprays  in  England and Wales  would  require 
organizational reforms in the way the use of force reports, injuries, 
and compensation claims are monitored and made available to police 
forces and the public (Rappert 2003b).  Indeed, a central conclusion 
of that study was that it cast ‘considerable doubt on the robustness of 
the  precautions  taken  and  demonstrates  a  continuing  failure  for 
relevant  government agencies to respond and learn from problems 
identified’  (ibid:  1269).   The  basic  deficiencies  then  identified  in 
relation to monitoring the health effects of the sprays remain today. 
The  introduction  of  adequate  post-incident  procedures  for 
understanding the effects associated less lethal weapons should be a 
part  of  documents  such  as  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Police  Use  of 
Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons.  
Sprague (2007) made the case for other types of institutional reform 
regarding the transparency of policy decisions.  The author can offer 
additional  remarks along these lines.   Much has been made of the 
enhanced transparency associated with the reports of  the Steering 
Group  for  Patten  Report  Recommendations  69  and  70  Relating  to 
Public Order Equipment.  In the Phase 3 report, Jane Kennedy (2002: 
1), then Minister of State for Northern Ireland, commented, ‘I want to 
draw attention to another, unprecedented aspect of the programme, 
namely its transparency.’  Whilst it may be true that the reports were 
a significant step up in transparency from previous reviews practices 
(e.g.,  those for the CS sprays), the extent of transparency was still 
questionable.  The author was one of very few who offered written 
comments  on the Phase  2,  3,  and 4  reports.   Yet,  while  letters  of 
acknowledgement were sent in responses, almost no effort was made 
to  address  the  numerous  questions  posed,  many  of  which  were 
repeated  over  the  submitted  comments.   Addressing  matters  of 
transparency  should  be  central  to  the  introduction  and  continuing 
assessment of force options.  
 The Pain Factor
The level of pain inflicted needs to be addressed within a discussion of 
less-lethal weapons.  When and how much pain is acceptable to inflict 
on members of the public is an important question no matter what the 
extent of long terms injuries sustained.  This is particularly the case if 
less lethal weapons become used in compliance functions.  Feelings of 
pain are extremely difficult to convey or assess by others, and this is 
certainly the case for electrical discharges.  Rejali (1999) poignantly 
commented  on  the  comparative  difficulty  of  assessing  the 
appropriateness of the use of electrical force when, in relation to the 
video taping of the Rodney King episode in 1992, he wrote ‘We all 
remember how badly Rodney King was beaten by L.A. police but no 
one remembers how many times King was shocked and how much 
voltage he received.’  One issue is the lack of visible cues during and 
after the use of certain weapons.  
Individuals  also  experience  pain  in  different  ways.   What  is  a 
traumatic experience for one person may not be regarded as so by 
another.   In  its  marketing  material  Taser  International  includes 
numerous reassuring accounts of volunteers being shocked. As stated 
in the company instructor material for trainers the:
reasoning for recommending such a sample is that the Instructor 
is truly enabled to know and understand how the M26 works. 
This will help better articulate the ADVANCED TASER’s effects 
both as  an  instructor  and potentially  as  an  expert  in  court  if 
necessary (Smith n.d.).  
In contrast, as far as the author is aware, the Police Federation of 
England and Wales still forbids officers from being shocked as part of 
trials.  Elsewhere, where individuals were allowed to volunteer to be 
shocked, the experience (even in highly controlled conditions) has not 
been regarded as a passing one.   British reporter Glenn Campbell 
received a 2 second shock and gave the following account: 
It  was  the  most  painful  experience  of  my  life.  The  shocks 
paralysed my thigh and legs and I  was screaming in agony.  If 
there  is  any  doubt  over  the  effectiveness  of  these  stun  guns, 
which could be issued to police in Britain this year, I am proof 
that they work […]  As crime reporter with Carlton TV's London 
Tonight I  volunteered to test the effect -  the first  journalist  to 
take part in such a trial.  But had I known the consequences I 
would never have put myself forward. The whole left side of my 
body  went  into  spasm.   It  was  like  being  filled  with  boiling 
concrete which was going hard very quickly.  It felt like it lasted 
an eternity.  I am almost ashamed to say that I let out a primal 
scream which seemed to come from the bottom of my stomach.  I 
did not lose consciousness but it was like a goods train had run 
over  my  legs.   I  was  completely  incapacitated.  It  took  15-30 
seconds to recover… (Campbell 2001). 
Lest  such  accounts  be  dismissed  outright,  it  should  be  noted  that 
officers receiving shocks from stun guns in the field have reported 
considerable  distress  from such  experiences,  and  these  have  been 
categorized  as  exceptional  and  traumatic  events  within  the  police 
(Cowan 2001).  All of these points highlight the problems associated 
when determining what  is  an acceptable  level  of  pain to inflict  on 
members of the public and others, and should inform debates about 
the appropriateness of the use of Tasers in particular settings.
Conclusion
Experience with the development, introduction, and management of 
less  lethal  weapons  in  the  UK,  the  US  and  elsewhere  has  given 
numerous grounds for concern. This concern centres around whether 
such activities have met the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’ call for the development 
and deployment of non-lethal weapons to be ‘carefully evaluated’ and 
‘carefully controlled.’  If police forces in the UK are to achieve high 
standards  of  conduct,  further measures  and renewed diligence are 
required. This would encompass the evidential basis for assessments, 
the rigor and transparency of testing procedures, the mechanisms in 
place for post-approval monitoring and feedback, and the accessibility 
of  use of force, injury, compensation, and complaint figures to both 
the police and the public.  In the end, it should be remembered that 
less-lethal weapons don’t save lives, good policing does.  New force 
options can be a part of professional policing, but not substitutes for 
it.
REFERENCES
Amnesty International (2004),  Excessive and Lethal Force? Amnesty 
International's  Concerns  about  Deaths  and  Ill-treatment  involving 
Police Use of Tasers, Washington, DC: Amnesty International (USA).
Association of Chief Police Officers (1996), Police Trials of CS for Self­defence in England  
and Wales ­ 1996, ACPO Guidelines for Use, London: House of Commons Library. 
Association of Chief Police Officers (1999), CS Incapacitant Spray: Notes for Guidance on  
Police Use, ACPO: London.   
Bradley D. (2004), ‘A Northern Ireland Perspective’ International Law 
Enforcement Conference, (London) 5 February.
Burrows,  C.  (2007),  ‘Critical  Decision  Making  by  Police  Firearms 
Officers’ Policing, 1(3).
Campbell, D. (1996), ‘Police Test CS Sprays to Combat Violence’, The 
Guardian, 19 January, 5
Campbell, G. (2001), ‘It Feels like being Filled with Boiling Concrete, 
Going Hard’ The Mirror, 23 August. 
Cowan, M. (2001), ‘My Stun Gun Horror’, Birmingham Evening Mail, 
23 October: 1.
Davies, P. (2004),  Operational Experience of “Taser” Presentation at 
“New  Non-Lethal  Weapons  Technologies:   Implications  for  British 
Policing”, University of Bradford, 9 November.
De Brito,  D.,  Challoner,  K.,  Sehgal,  A.  and Mallon,  W.  (2001),  ‘The 
Injury  Pattern  of  a  New  Law  Enforcement  Weapon’  Annals  of 
Emergency Medicine, October 38(4): 383-390.
Dror,  *.  (2007),  ‘Perception of Risk and the Decision to Use Force’ 
Policing, 1(3).
Glass, D. (2007), ‘A Fatal Question: Why Don’t the Police Shoot People 
in the Leg?’ Policing, 1(3).
Haynes, N. (2000), Association of Chief Police Officers. Personal Interview 13 June.
Houde-Walter,  W.  (1996),  Violence Reduction  and Assailant  Control 
with  Integral  Laser-sighted  Police  Pistols, Presentation  at  SPIE 
Conference  Security  Systems  and  Nonlethal  Technologies  for  Law 
Enforcement, 19-21 November Boston, MA.
International Association of Chiefs of Police. (1995),  Pepper Sprays 
Evaluation Project, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 
IPCC. (2004),  Independent Police Complaints Commission Welcomes 
Decision to Allow Firearms Officers to Use Tasers, 15 September.
  
Kaminski,  R,  Edwards,  S.  and  J.  Johnson.  (1999),  ‘Assessing  the 
Incapacitative Effects  of  Pepper Spray during Resistive  Encounters 
with the Police’, Policing, 22: 7-29.
Kennedy, J. (2002) Forward to A Research Programme into Alternative 
Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict- Phase 3, 
Belfast: Northern Ireland Office.
Kimerer, C. (2003), Philosophy, Design Implementation & Operational 
Experience of the Seattle Police Department  Less Lethal Program, 
Presented  at  the  Less  Lethal  Weapons  Conference,  15-16  April 
Shrivenham, Wiltshire.
Kleinig,  J.  (2007),  ‘Ethical  Constraints  on  Taser  Use  by  Police’ 
Policing, 1(3).
Kossoff, J. (1998), ‘Police now Use CS Sprays More than Truncheons’, 
Independent on Sunday, 9 August: 1-3
Lawrence,  R.  (2000),  The  Politic  of  Force, Berkeley:  University  of 
California Press.
Lumb, R. and Friday, P. (1997) ‘Impact of pepper spray availability on 
police officer use-of-force decisions’ Policing: An International Journal 
of Police Strategies & Management, 20(1): 136-148.
Police  Complaints  Authority.  (2000),  CS  spray:  Increasing  Public 
Safety?, London: Police Complaints Authority.
Police Complaints Authority (2003), Firearms Report 2003,  London, 
PCA, 2003.
 
Police Research Group. (1996), A Review of Police Trials of the CS 
Aerosol Incapacitant, London: Police Research Group Publication.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004)  Association of Chief Police Officers: 
Independent  Evaluation  of  the  Operational  Trial  of  Taser, Final 
Report, April.
Rappert,  B.  (2003a),  Non-Lethal  Weapons  as  Legitimizing  Forces?: 
Technology, Politics  and the Management of Conflict, London: Frank 
Cass.
Rappert, B. (2003b), ‘Health and Safety in Policing’, Social Science & 
Medicine, 56 (6): 1269-1278.
Rappert, B. (2003c), ‘Shock Tactics’  New Scientist, 15 February: 34-
37.
Rappert, B. (2002), ‘Assessing Chemical Incapacitants”  International 
Journal of Police Science and Management, 4(2): 115-126.
Rayment, T. (1996), ‘Bolt-down Britain’, Times, 7 January. 
Reiner, R. (1997), ‘Policing and the police’, in M Maguire, R Morgan, 
and R Reiner,  eds.,  The Oxford Handbook of Criminology,  2nd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rejali,  D.  (1999),  Electric  Torture, February  1999.   At 
<http://internationalstudies.uchicago.edu/torture/abstracts/dariusrejal
i.html> 
Smith,  R.  (n.d.)  TASER  International  Instructor  Training  Bulletin 
Issue:  Mandatory  hits  with  the  ADVANCED TASER Scottsdale,  AZ: 
TASER International. 
Sprague, O. (2007),  ‘The Deployment of Taser Weapons to UK Law 
Enforcement  Officials:  An  Amnesty  International  Perspective’ 
Policing, 1(3).
Steering  Group  for  Patten  Report  Recommendations  69  and  70 
Relating to Public Order Equipment. (2004),  A Research Programme 
into  Alternative  Policing  Approaches  Towards  the  Management  of 
Conflict- Phase IV, Belfast: Northern Ireland Office.
Straw, J. (1999), ‘Policing (London)’ Hansard, 16 July London, HMSO, 
column 691. 
TASER International.  (2000)  This  is  as  Close to 100% TAKEDOWN 
POWER  as  You  Can  Get,  Promotional  literature,  Scottsdale,  AZ: 
TASER International.
TASER  International  (2002),  Certification  Lesson  Plan, Version  8.0 
Scottsdale, AZ: TASER International.
Turner, M. (2004),  Review Of Taser Within The MPS,  London: MPS 
Commissioner  ,10  September.  Available  at 
http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/cop/2004/040910/04.htm
Waddington, PAJ (1999), Policing Citizens, London: UCL Press.
Waldren, *. (2007), ‘********’ Policing 1(3).
